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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

MONROE MONTE FARMER,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOS. 47282-2019, 47283-2019, &
47284-2019
BINGHAM COUNTY NOS. CR06-19-1273,
CR06-19-1274, & CR06-19-1290
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Monroe Monte Farmer pied guilty to burglary, fleeing or eluding a police officer,
aggravated assault, and driving under the influence in three consolidated cases. He was
sentenced to unified terms of eleven years, with five years fixed. In this consolidated appeal,
Mr. Farmer argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In April 2019, Mr. Farmer was arrested after a high-speed pursuit. (See 47283 R., p.17.) 1
He was then charged in multiple cases with multiple counts of burglary, fleeing or eluding a
police officer, aggravated assault on certain personnel, accessory to burglary, driving under the
influence, destruction of evidence, and principal to burglary. (47282 R., pp.7-8 (Case CR06-191273 ("the first burglary case")); 47283 R., pp.9-11 (Case CR06-19-1274 ("the eluding and
aggravated assault case")); 47284 R., pp.7-9 (Case CR06-19-1290 ("the second burglary
case")).) After waiving his preliminary hearings, he was bound over to district court in all cases.
(47283 R., p.48.) An Information was then filed in each case. (See 47282 R., p.31; 47283
R., pp.49-51; 47284 R., pp.30-32.) In the eluding and aggravated assault case, the State also filed
enhancements for use of a firearm and being a member of a gang. (47283 R., pp.53-55.)
The parties entered into a plea agreement wherein Mr. Farmer pleaded guilty to five
charges: in the first burglary case, to Count I: Burglary; in the second burglary case, to Count V:
Burglary; and in the eluding and aggravated assault case to Count I: Fleeing or Attempting to
Elude, Count II: Aggravated Assault, and Count IV: Driving Under the Influence. (CoP.Tr., p.5,
Ls.16-19; p.9, Ls.14-19.)2 In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges in both
the second burglary case and the eluding and aggravated assault case, dismiss the enhancements
filed in the eluding and aggravated assault case, amend Count II in the eluding and aggravated
assault case to simple aggravated assault (from aggravated assault on certain personnel), dismiss
a fourth case in its entirety, recommend that the burglary charges run concurrent with each other,
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Citations to the clerk's records will be referred to by the Docket Number and type of document.
Transcripts for all three cases were combined into one electronic file. The transcript from the
June 3, 2019 Change of Plea Hearing will be cited to as CoP.Tr. and will reference the specific
page numbers for that hearing. The transcript for the August 8, 2019 Sentencing Hearing will be
cited as Sent. Tr. and will reference the specific page numbers for that hearing.
2
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and that it would concur in the recommendation from the presentence investigation. (4 7282
R., p.43; 47283 R., p.96; 47284 R., p.47.) Mr. Farmer also agreed to pay restitution in all cases.
(CoP.Tr., p.10, Ls.10-13.)
A sentencing hearing was then held. (47282 R., pp.66-68; 47283 R., pp.123-25; 47284
R., pp.69-71.) Counsel for Mr. Farmer recommended he be placed on probation and that all
sentences run concurrent with each other. (Sent.Tr., p.13, Ls.8-9; p.15, Ls.9-10.) The State
recommended eight years, with two fixed, on each of the burglary charges, that those charges run
concurrent to each other; that he be given "the full sentence" on the DUI charge, that charge to
run concurrent to the others; five years, with two fixed, on the fleeing and eluding charge, that
the sentence for that charge to run consecutive to the others; and five years, with two years fixed
for the aggravated assault charge, that the sentence for that charge to run consecutive to the
others. (Sent.Tr., p.18, L.18 - p.19, L.5.) The court clarified that the State was asking for "a total
fixed time of six years" altogether which the State confirmed. (Sent.Tr., p.19, Ls.6-13.) The State
then asked that the court retain jurisdiction. (Sent.Tr., p.19, Ls.16-18.) The court sentenced
Mr. Farmer to a total unified term of eleven years, with five years fixed, as follows: On the first
burglary case, six years, with two years fixed (Sent.Tr., p.25, Ls.10-13); on the second burglary
case, a concurrent term of six years, with two years fixed (Sent.Tr., p.26, Ls.15-21); and on the
eluding and aggravated assault case, five years, with two years fixed, on the eluding charge, five
years, with three years fixed, on the aggravated assault charge, and six months on the DUI, with
for all the charges in that case to run concurrent with each other, but consecutive to the charges
in the two burglary cases (Sent. Tr., p.26, L.22 - p.28, L.3). The district court declined to place
Mr. Farmer on probation or to retain jurisdiction. (Sent.Tr., p.28, Ls.4-8.) A global Judgment of
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Conviction was entered in all three cases. (47282 R., pp.69-72; 47283 R., pp.126-29; 47284
R., pp.72-75.)
Mr. Farmer timely appealed from the Judgment of Conviction. (47282 R., pp.75-77;
47283 R., pp.132-34; 47284 R., pp.78-80.) These appeals were then consolidated. (47282
R., p.88; 47283 R., p.147; 47284 R., p.91.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed unified sentences of eleven years, with
five years fixed, upon Mr. Farmer following his pleas of guilty to burglary, fleeing or eluding a
police officer, aggravated assault, and driving under the influence?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Unified Sentences Of Eleven Years,
With Five Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Farmer Following His Pleas Of Guilty To Burglary, Fleeing
Or Eluding A Police Officer, Aggravated Assault, And Driving Under The Influence

Introduction
Mr. Farmer asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentences of eleven years,
with five years fixed, are excessive. Specifically, he contends the district court abused its
discretion by imposing excessive sentences, especially by having the sentences for eluding,
aggravated assault, and DUI run consecutive to the other sentences.

A.

Standard Of Review
A court's decisions at sentencing are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567 (Ct. App. 1982) (The Idaho "Supreme Court has applied a
general standard of "clear abuse of discretion" to appellate review of sentencing decisions"
(citing State v. Ogata, 95 Idaho 309, 508 P.2d 141 (1973)). The Idaho Supreme Court has held
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that, '" [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a
clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130
Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573 (1979)). Because Mr. Farmer
does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, in order to show an abuse of
discretion he must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive
considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original). "However, in

exercising that discretion, reasonableness is a fundamental requirement." State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982) (citing State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723, 604 P.2d 737 (1979)).
When a sentence is reviewed, the reviewing court will "consider the defendant's entire
sentence." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007). However, the reviewing court will "treat
the minimum period specified by the sentencing judge as the probable duration of confinement."
State v. Phillips, 121 Idaho 261, 262 (Ct. App. 1992).

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Excessive Sentences
Mr. Farmer asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentences of six years,

with two years fixed, and five years, with two years fixed, are excessive. "Even where the district
court appropriately understands its discretion and sentences a defendant according to the
applicable legal principles, an unreasonably excessive sentence can still be an abuse of
discretion, and this Court can reduce the sentence." State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 835 (2011).
District Courts are allowed to place individuals directly on probation or to retain jurisdiction
5

because "the purpose of the [sentencing] statute is the reformation and rehabilitation of a
defendant, particularly a first offender, and to give him an opportunity to reform and take his

proper place in society." State v. O'Dell, 71 Idaho 64, 69 (1950) (citing LC. § 19-2601)
(emphasis added). Mr. Farmer's tribal probation officer recommended that he "serve at least a
rider," and the presentence investigator and the State both recommended the court retain
jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.I 1, 20; Sent.Tr., p.19, Ls.16-18.) 3 Mr. Farmer asserts that by not allowing
him to utilize community rehabilitative resources or the programming available in a retained
jurisdiction, the court abused its discretion by not correctly applying the applicable sentencing
criteria to him and his actions. See State v. Dallas, 109 Idaho 670, 675 (1985) ("Once a criminal
defendant's guilt has been established, the trial judge is under a duty to tailor the sentence to the
individual defendant"). He makes this assertion because his current "sentence essentially
discounts any possibility ofrehabilitation and successful reentry into society." Cook v. State, 145
Idaho 482, 489 (Ct. App. 2008).
Courts are required to consider mitigating evidence in favor of the defendant at
sentencing. See State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002) (noting that when reviewing a
sentence, Idaho's appellate courts will "review the record on appeal, having due regard for the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest")
(emphasis added); State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007) (same). Mr. Farmer acknowledges
that the court did recognize his mental health issues as mitigating. (See Sent.Tr., p.23, L.16 p.24, L.3.) But Mr. Farmer specifically asserts the district court abused its discretion by not

3

Because the first 42 pages of the presentence investigation report ("PSI") are identical across
all three cases, citations to those pages will cite to PSI. But where documents are different across
all three case records, citations will be in the format of [Docket Number] PSI. ( Compare 4 7283
PSI, pp.1-42 with 47283 PSI, pp.1-42, and 47284 PSI, pp.1-42.)
6

adequately considering other mitigating evidence concerning his drug addiction and willingness
for treatment, his remorse and accountability for his actions, or his lack of criminal history.
Mr. Farmer has a life-long drug and alcohol addiction problem. (PSI, pp.24-25
(describing alcohol use that "initiated at age 14," and methamphetamine and other stimulant use
that "initiated at age 23").) Courts are encouraged to consider alternatives to incarceration for
individuals with these problems. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (reducing
defendant's sentence, in part, because "the trial court did not give proper consideration of the
defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime [the
defendant had been drinking at the time of the offense] and the suggested alternatives for treating
the problem"). Courts should also look at "a willingness to seek treatment for an alcohol [or
drug] problem" as a mitigating factor. State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008).
Here, in mid-2018, Mr. Farmer lost custody of his only child which led him "to feed [his]
alcohol addition to numb [his] pain and drink [himself] out of depression from feeling like [a]
bad parent[]." (PSI, pp.6-7.) The GAIN-I evaluator noted that Mr. Farmer "meets lifetime criteria
for substance abuse use disorder severe." (PSI, p.25.) Mr. Farmer reported that over the past ten
years, he had attempted to use community outpatient group therapy "a couple times" but had "no
engagement" in those programs. (PSI, pp.17, 22.) Accordingly, the GAIN-I evaluator
recommended that Mr. Farmer "participate in Level 2.1 Outpatient Treatment with Safe and
Sober Housing." (PSI, p.35.) Mr. Farmer told the presentence investigator that he wanted to
"remain drug free, and that he would also benefit from a substance abuse treatment program."
(PSI, p.16.)
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Accordingly, Mr. Farmer asserts the district court did not adequately consider his drug
addiction problem or his desire for treatment when it refused to consider probation or a retained
jurisdiction and instead imposed incarceration.
Courts should also consider as mitigating whether a defendant accepts responsibility for
their actions and expresses "remorse for his conduct." State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209
(Ct.App. 1991) (holding that some leniency was required, in part, because the defendant
expressed "remorse for his conduct"); See also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982)
(reducing indeterminate portion of sentence based on, among other factors, defendant's
voluntary drug addiction rehabilitation and because ""the defendant has accepted responsibility
for his acts"); State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 224 (1985) ("The sentencing judge found several
mitigating factors, including Caudill's youthful age, prior nonviolent nature, lack of prior
criminal record, potential for rehabilitation, and remorse."); State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293,
295-96 (1997) (finding a fixed-life sentence excessive for reasons that included the fact that the
defendant "took full responsibility for his actions, and did not blame the victims in any way").
Here, Mr. Farmer has not blamed the victims in any way, like the defendant in Jackson,
he has expressed remorse for his actions, like the defendants in Alberts and Caudill, and he has
taken full "responsibility for his acts," like the defendant in Shideler. Mr. Farmer said he "[feels]
sorry for committing all the crimes and [takes] full [responsibility]. (PSI, p. 7.) He said,
I am sorry for my criminal behavior in this past year and I would like to
[apologize] to the community of Blackfoot and county of Bingham for my
[illegal] crimes that I took part in and committed. To as well as the [innocent]
[civilians] and [bystanders] of Blackfoot that were victimized in my partake [sic]
while I committed these acts of crimes against the community of Blackfoot. I did
not want to hurt or put anyone in danger while I did these criminal acts, nor was it
my intension[] to involve anyone in the process of my criminal acts. So again to
the community and Victims and courts in Blackfoot I am [truly] sorry for my
behavior and I will take [full] responsibility [for] my actions and take full
responsibility [for] my punishment. I greatly [apologize].
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(PSI, pp.16-17.) When he met with a detective after his arrest, he didn't try to deny anything and
cooperated with him in fully describing his role in all the crimes he committed. (See 47283 PSI,
pp.79-82.) Likewise, the presentence investigator said Mr. Farmer was "prepared and friendly
and didn't hesitate to answer my questions. [He] admitted to all of the charges he pled to." (PSI,
p.19.) At sentencing, he told the court he had "apologize[ d] to the community" for his actions
and that he "didn't mean to put anybody in harm that day." (Sent.Tr., p.20, Ls.15-17.) The court
said Mr. Farmer acknowledged "[t]he charges in this case are extremely serious." (Sent.Tr., p.22,
Ls.13-14.) But Mr. Farmer asserts the district court abused its discretion when it did not
adequately consider his remorse and acceptance of responsibility for his actions.
Mr. Farmer also asserts the district court did not adequately consider his lack of previous
felonies and that these felonies were part of one sequence of events. "[T]he primary objective of
sentencing is protection of society" as well as the "related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and
retribution." State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, (2019). "A sentence of confinement fixed for
longer than necessary to accomplish these purposes is unreasonable." State v. Sheahan, 139
Idaho 267, 284 (2003). In addition,
courts have long recognized that the first offender should be accorded more
lenient treatment than the habitual criminal. In addition to considerations of
humanity, justice and mercy, the object is to encourage and foster the
rehabilitation of one who has for the first time fallen into error, and whose
character for crime has not become fixed.
State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953). overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94
Idaho 227,228 (1971)); State v. O'Dell, 71 Idaho 64, 69 (1950) (same) (citing LC.§ 19-2601). A
defendant's "prior nonviolent nature, lack of prior criminal record, potential for rehabilitation,
and remorse" can all be considered as mitigating factors. State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 224
(1985).
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Aggregate sentences may be excessive and unreasonable in certain circumstances, such
as when "the charges arose from a single continuing plan of deception." Cook v. State, 145 Idaho
482, 489 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding aggregate sentence for nine related counts of grand theft to be
excessive, in part, because "the charges arose from a single continuing plan of deception");
State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 693 (1976) (modifying sentences from consecutive to concurrent

because the two crimes "arose out of the same act"); see also State v. Monroe, 97 Idaho 457, 457
(1976) (modifying sentence for actions that were part of a "common scheme or plan" because
"imposition of three consecutive fourteen year sentences was unduly harsh and an abuse of
discretion"); State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct.App.1998) (modifying sentences to run
concurrently instead of consecutively due to the nature of the offenses and the defendant's lack of
criminal background); but compare State v. Teske, 123 Idaho 975, 977 (Ct. App. 1993)
(declining to order sentences to be served concurrently instead of consecutively where defendant
had prior criminal history, inability to maintain steady employment, and a problem with drug and
alcohol abuse).
Here, prior to the events of these cases, Mr. Farmer had "eight prior misdemeanor cases
containing nine convictions;" but "[e]ight of the convictions [were] for driver's license or
insurance offenses, and one [was] for failing to present ID for alcohol." (PSI, p.11.) And even
those convictions were not recent. (See PSI, p.11 ("There are no convictions in iCourt Portal
between 2013 and 2017.").) The court acknowledged the four felony counts he pled guilty to
were his "first, second, third, and fourth, felony convictions," and that his "record prior to that
wasn't extensive." (Sent.Tr., p.22, Ls.6-8.) The State did not explain why it asked for those
sentences to be consecutive to the other charges, and the court had clarified with the prosecutor
that Mr. Farmer had not pointed a gun at the pursuing officers. (See Sent.Tr., p.17, Ls.23-25
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("There was a car chase. There was some gun pointing. THE COURT: Granted, not by this
individual. [PROSECUTOR] Correct, just with a group of people.") But the court still ordered
that the charges from the eluding and aggravated assault case be served consecutive to the two
burglary cases. (Sent. Tr., p.28, Ls.2-3.) Mr. Farmer asserts that this was an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, Mr. Farmer asserts the district court abused its discretion when it declined
to place him directly on probation or to retain jurisdiction. The court then further abused its
discretion by imposing excessive sentences by having the sentences from the eluding and
aggravated assault case run consecutive to the other cases.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Farmer respectfully requests that this Court remand his case with orders that he is to
be placed on probation. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 31 st day of March, 2020.

/s/ R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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